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Abstract
Destination IP prefix-based routing protocols are core to
Internet routing today. Internet autonomous systems (AS)
possess fixed IP prefixes, while packets carry the intended
destination AS’s prefix in their headers, in clear text. As
a result, network communications can be easily identified
using IP addresses and become targets of a wide variety
of attacks, such as DNS/IP filtering, distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM) at-
tacks, etc. In this work, we explore an alternative network
architecture that fundamentally removes such vulnerabili-
ties by disassociating the relationship between IP prefixes
and destination networks, and by allowing any end-to-end
communication session to have dynamic, short-lived, and
pseudo-random IP addresses drawn from a range of IP pre-
fixes rather than one. The concept is seemingly impossi-
ble to realize in todays Internet. We demonstrate how this
is doable today with three different strategies using soft-
ware defined networking (SDN), and how this can be done
at scale to transform the Internet addressing and routing
paradigms with the novel concept of a distributed software
defined Internet exchange (SDX). The solution works with
both IPv4 and IPv6, whereas the latter provides higher de-
grees of IP addressing freedom. Prototypes based on Open
vSwitches (OVS) have been implemented for experimenta-
tion across the PEERING BGP testbed. The SDX solu-
tion not only provides a technically sustainable pathway to-
wards large-scale traffic analysis resistant network (TARN)
support, it also unveils a new business model for customer-
driven, customizable and trustable end-to-end network ser-
vices.
1 Introduction
Internet was not designed with security and privacy in
mind and is littered with security holes. The notorious
network censorship, BGP hijacking [10, 32], man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks, and distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks [25, 35], to name a few, pose real threat to
network security and user privacy. These attacks all rely
on a seemingly innocuous and crucial element of today’s
Internet Protocol (IP) to identify their victims – the IP ad-
dresses of the communicating source and destination. At
domain-level routing, network operators rely on IP prefix-
based BGP protocol for inter-domain routing. And what’s
worse, IP addresses carried in packet headers are always in
clear text.
Consequently, national firewalls easily restrict inhabi-
tants’ access to information by simply blocking the IP ad-
dresses of those websites [8]. While encryption and vir-
tual private networks (VPN) provide some protection, some
countries use traffic analysis to further track citizens that
access opposition web sites. Similarly, victims of DDoS at-
tacks and MITM attacks have nowhere to hide due to the
static binding between the hosts and their uniquely identi-
fied IP addresses.
The proposed work explores an alternative end-to-end
network architecture called the Traffic Analysis Resistant
Network (TARN) that fundamentally removes the vulnera-
bility due to fixed IP addresses of communication sessions
by using, instead, multiple short-lived, seemingly random
IP addresses. By breaking the static binding between hosts
and IP addresses, TARN makes it impossible for attackers
to detect communication sessions by observing the source
and destination addresses. While in theory traffic analy-
sis methods can analyze other properties of network traffic,
e.g., protocol types [9], packet sizes and inter-packet tim-
ing [33], to infer the nature of communication, IP addresses
are undeniably the prime references used by attackers today.
We recognize TARN induces disruptive changes to multiple
aspects of the Internet, ranging from domain name lookup
to packet forwarding; an incremental approach to gradually
introduce TARN into Internet is hence critical. In this pa-
per, we give an overview of three implementation strategies
that realizes TARN at different scopes and discuss their im-
plications.
TARN would not have been practical without two recent
technology trends – software defined networking (SDN)
and cloud-based virtual network functions (VNF). With
SDN, end-to-end communication sessions can be identi-
fied and modified (in TARN’s case, the IP addresses) with
fine grain packet header fields at flexible network locations.
With cloud-basedVNF, TARN functions can be scalably in-
stantiated driven by user and application demands. As dis-
cussed in section 3, besides the option of running TARN
at an end host, a cloud-based implementation of TARN,
which we call a software defined network exchange (SDX),
can be operated by a provider much like the Internet ex-
change providers today with advanced, highly customizable
services for communication sessions. We envision SDXs
to offer end users a logically centralized portal to request
and configure services with user-chosen attributes, with the
actual TARN packet handling to be executed across a dis-
tributed network of SDX sites.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides related work in the area of anonymity net-
work and a brief introduction of SDX. In section 3, we
introduce the TARN architecture and the implementation
strategies. Early experimentation results are discussed in
section 4. The paper concludes in section 5 with potential
challenges and the future work.
2 Related Work
Various proxy services such as The Onion Routing
(Tor) [7], Psiphon [5], and I2P [1], make traffic analy-
sis difficult by inserting intermediate nodes between packet
source and destination. The extent to which they can pro-
tect communication rely on such intermediate nodes’ ability
to remain unknown to adversaries. With their IP addresses
being fixed, their success is limited to the time it takes for
adversaries to detect them and start analyzing or blocking
communications going through them.
Researchers have found the increased latency due to the
use of intermediate nodes in such solutions to be a major
impediment to user acceptance [26]. I2P is not very widely
used. Tor is commonly attacked by countries finding Tor
entry nodes and blocking their IP addresses. This can in-
clude active probing of nodes suspected of providing entry
to the Tor network [29]. Tor is mostly blocked by Chinese
government. One Tor initiative avoids traffic blocking by
using “pluggable transports” to obfuscate the traffic pattern
for the first hop of the proxy. The issue with the traffic ob-
fuscation techniques is that they only obfuscate communi-
cation patterns, but not the end hosts [19]. Another concern
with proxy networks is that users must trust the intermedi-
ate nodes, any of which could be compromised to perform
a MITM attack.
Decoy routing, a new alternative, inserts steganography
information into the header of SSL packets which is rec-
ognized by “decoy routers” in the backbone, who re-route
packets to their intended destination [22]. One drawback is
that nodes currently have to attempt connections at random
until they find the decoy routing node.
There are other recent SDN-based solutions, e.g., the
OpenFlow-based random host mutation (OFRHM) [21],
aiming to use OpenFlow to randomly mutate source host
IP addresses to avoid unwanted traffic analysis. However,
OFRHM uses random addresses within the same subnet of
a source node.
The notion of SDX was first described in 2013 by Feam-
ster, et al. [18] as a Software Defined Internet Exchange,
applying SDN at Internet exchange points (IXP) to enable
finer grain, application specific peering beyondwhat BGP is
capable of today. Since then, various forms and applications
of SDX have been proposed. In [24], SDX was defined as
a software defined networking exchange that supports in-
terconnect of multiple network domains at flexible layers
(not limited to layer 3 or BGP) via signaling among feder-
ated network controllers. At the 2013 SDN Program Re-
view workshop [12], one more form of SDX was discussed
to be an exchange point for software defined infrastructure
(SDI) facilities, providing both SDN interconnect and in-
line compute services that can be custom programmed via
software APIs.
3 The TARN Architecture
Figure 1: The architecture of TARN for the use case of network
censorship circumvention. A client wants to connect to YouTube
that is blocked by the client’s local ISP.
3.1 Overview
The core concept of TARN is to bind the two ends of
a communication with dynamic, ephemeral and perpetually
changing IP addresses. Only authorized users who know
the functions used for finding the address “hopping” pat-
tern can track the IP changes over time. This is similar to
frequency-hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) [28] for wire-
less communications. In this context, we are proposing IP
hopping in address space. By doing so, TARN effectively
hides the client or/and server from being detected by mali-
cious attackers.
To facilitate an introduction, we consider a use case of
TARN – network censorship circumvention. The corre-
sponding TARN architecture is illustrated in Figure 1, in
which the client wants to access YouTube which is blocked
by the client’s local Internet service provider (ISP). The ob-
jective is to enable the client to access YouTube without
the ISP detecting and blocking the communication between
them. We assume the ISP can monitor all traffic leaving and
entering the AS.
In this particular scenario, it is impractical to assume a
client would use randomized IP addresses. Most ISPs con-
trol the assignment of a fixed IP address to a client. Only the
server side (i.e., YouTube) adopts IP hopping in this case.
As illustrated in Figure 1, YouTube employs distributed
SDX TARN service across the Internet. With the service,
YouTube can customize its IP hopping pattern and commu-
nicate it with the client as an authorized customer. The SDX
provider would provide YouTube a number of different IP
prefixes where IP addresses can be flexibly and dynamically
used by the YouTube server over time. In this case, the
SDX provider will own sufficiently many IP prefixes that
can be allocated, most possibly through a lease, to a service
provider as YouTube. Note that TARN does not suffer from
IP blocking as most other privacy-preserving technologies,
including Tor.
3.2 Security features of TARN
The fixed binding between hosts and IP addresses are
crucial to today’s Internet routing. However, such scheme
has also been taken advantage of by malicious attackers.
It enables IP/DNS filtering to become a common method
used by nation-state firewalls to block opposition websites.
Network users who struggle against censorship really have
only two options: VPN and proxy, neither of which can
avoid being blocked once being identified. Moreover, fixed
IP addresses are also the prime references used by attack-
ers to target their victims, which is a necessary step before
staging any malicious attacks.
As a result, breaking the rule of fixed IP addresses be-
comes a natural solution to thwart network attacks. As the
most innovative element of TARN, the idea of IP hopping
is similar, but in many aspects superior to the fast flux tech-
nique used by the notorious botnets to elude detection [16].
And the effectiveness of fast flux as an anti-detection mea-
sure has been thoroughly tested and validated in practice
by the protracted game between botnets and law enforce-
ment [14]. Therefore, we envision that the adoption of
TARNwill mitigate a significant portion of network attacks.
3.2.1 Massaging the IP hopping patterns
We are fully aware that abnormally frequent change of
IP addresses may be exploited by adversaries to identify
TARN users. We must account for the possible side-channel
analysis on the IP hopping frequency of TARN users. In this
work, we “massage” the IP hopping pattern of TARN users’
traffic to make it statistically identical to that of the regular
network users [34]. This allows traffic generated by TARN
users to be seamlessly blended into the background traffic.
The idea is to construct a hidden Markov model (HMM)
that represents the IP hopping pattern of regular users and
then use the model to determine the dwell time of each IP
address for TARN users. The inferred model is known as a
deterministic HMM [31, 30, 23]. Unlike the standard HMM
that has two sets of random processes: states and observa-
tions. In a deterministic HMM, there is only a single set of
random processes (time intervals between two hops in this
case). So the state transition labels are uniquely associated
with an output alphabet.
Given the inferred model, TARN service starts the tim-
ing side-channelmassage by randomly selecting a start state
in the model. To determine the dwell time of the current ad-
dress, a transition is taken from the current state and the
corresponding time interval is waited before switching to
the next address. If there are more than one possible transi-
tions out of current state, the transition is chosen randomly,
weighed on the probability of each transition.
Deep packet inspection (DPI) techniques censor traffic
based on the application-layer content and can be used to
identify TARN users. We have developed pluggable trans-
ports for Tor that mimic protocols like NTP, video games,
and smart grid sensors [34]. Our pluggable transports en-
crypt a session and then translate the AES encrypted data
into the syntax of another host protocol. Integration of our
pluggable transports into TARN for DPI circumvention is
beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3 Implementation Strategies
The TARN architecture can assumemultiple forms, from
a “host-only” end-to-end solution to a distributed SDX so-
lution. We discuss three different implementation strate-
gies that serve different needs and scopes. All designs are
compatible with existing network infrastructure and routing
protocols. While implementations vary, they all adopt SDN
for programmatic packet switching based on packet flow at-
tributes at different protocol layers (layer 2–layer 4).
Recall that the two core functions of TARN are 1) to
unbind IP prefixes from ASes; and 2) to allow sustainable
communication sessions between two ends with short-lived
and seemingly randomized IP addresses (not constrained to
a single prefix). To achieve this, three design patterns are
possible: end-host TARN agent, campus TARN gateway,
and SDX TARN service, each of which assumes adiffer-
ent threat model. Table 1 provides a synopsis of the trade-
offs for them. Each design pattern implements IP rewriting
where appropriate to the specific threat model, i.e., the trust
boundary.
3.3.1 End-host TARN agent
In the first pattern, a software agent sits on each end host,
together with a virtual SDN switch such as Open vSwitch
(OVS) [17], to rewrite the destination and/or source IP ad-
dresses before the packets leave the host. The pattern as-
sumes any part of the network between two end hosts are
potentially vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks, and thus,
requires address rewrite to protect both ends’ identity and
accessibility. This design pattern typically suffices in al-
lowing a person/client to access a website, e.g., google.com,
that would otherwise be blocked by the person’s ISP.
Design
Pattern
Host
application
required
BGP route
announce-
ments
Trust boundary
End-host
TARN agent
X X Host-only
Campus
TARN
gateway
✗ X Campus network
SDX-based
TARN
service
✗ ✗
Campus network
+ Path to SDX
facilities
Table 1: Considerations for three TARN design patterns.
The TARN agent running on the client-host will rewrite
the destination address of the outgoing requests to the web-
site. On the website servers end, either a TARN agent or
a TARN gateway (see section 3.3.2) would be used to ac-
cept the incoming requests and rewrite them into the correct,
original web server addresses. One critical requirement to
note – the server side needs to announce via BGP new pre-
fixes that are not the organization’s known prefixes. Such
prefixes can be scavenged from unused prefixes (a lot more
in IPv6 than in IPv4) in the near term. In the long term, we
believe SDXs can acquire large pools of IP prefixes for its
customers’ scheduled reuse. Such prefixes will only be held
by any organization for a relatively short time to prevent
adversaries from detecting their relationship. The prefixes
will only be made known to registered customers through
authenticated means to avoid adversaries to fish for the ad-
dressing scheme.
3.3.2 Campus TARN gateway
The second pattern relieves the end hosts’ burden and runs
the IP rewrite actions at a campus gateway router, called
the TARN gateway. End hosts choosing to use the service
set the TARN gateway their default router. This pattern as-
sumes the entire campus network as a trusted domain where
TARN protection is not necessary. This pattern makes more
sense to be adopted by major, multi-campus corporates that
need to have discrete anonymized inter-campus communi-
cations. As a result, the TARN gateways are expected to be
deployed at all participating campuses and their functions
will be symmetric for any inter-campus communication ses-
sions.
3.3.3 SDX TARN service
As we explore different implementation strategies for
TARN, the concept of a distributed SDX surfaces as an at-
tractive option. Recent studies have explored SDX in dif-
ferent forms and for different purposes [18].
Thus far, a SDX has been considered as a SDN-
empowered IXP facility - a place where networks of mul-
tiple ASes interconnect and forward packet traffic. Today,
there are hundreds of IXPs worldwide, and the large IXPs
can be interconnecting up to several hundred ASes and for-
warding a quarter billion IP addresses each week [11]. In
our study, we consider a distributed SDX with the follow-
ing properties:
• Consisting of multiple distributed facilities spread
across Internet;
• Connecting ASes at flexible protocol layers, e.g., as
layer-2 circuits or layer-3 routes;
• Supporting custom packet transformation in addition
to packet switching, programmable across any affili-
ated facilities; and
• Serving each AS as a customer, and facilitating
programmable customer-to-customer packet exchange
(i.e., transformation and switching).
To achieve these properties, we expect each SDX facility
to have a SDN-based switching fabric for interconnecting
customer ASes and exchanging traffic between them, and
a cloud-like compute infrastructure that executes network
functions in between any ASes for custom packet transfor-
mation demands. A SDX provider is expected to operate
sufficiently many facilities at strategic locations across In-
ternet. Customers for such a SDX service will, most likely
through a provider portal, provision a range of network
functions at any or all of the provider’s facilities to handle
incoming and outgoing traffic flows among theirs and oth-
ers ASes. Figure 2 illustrates the distributed SDX. Gupta
Figure 2: Distributed SDX, where each participant AS connects
of a SDX.
et. al have shown in [18] that integrating SDX with ex-
isting IXP infrastructure and conventional BGP-speaking
ASes is straightforward. And our TARN service makes a
compelling wide-area traffic delivery application of SDX.
The SDX pattern consolidates all TARN packet transfor-
mation and switching functions to a SDX facility, so the
customers are primarily networks, groups of networks or
ASes (AS 43515, which is YouTubes AS number) rather
than individual end users. In the case of censorship cir-
cumvention, the SDX TARN service appeals to customers
like Google, Youtube, NYT, Facebook, Twitter, etc, which
are blocked by many nation-state firewalls. From each cus-
tomer network, be it a campus network or a CDN, we as-
sume a secure channel between the customer and the SDX
facility. For example, a layer-2 connection such as the In-
ternet2 Advanced Layer 2 Service (AL2S) [20] can be used.
In this case, each customer will have a dedicated landing
place which most possibly can be a virtual machine (VM),
on which the TARN configurations can be controlled com-
pletely by the end-user organization. As a result, the SDX
facility can be viewed as a public cloud, with many VMs (at
least one per customer) interconnected by the SDN fabric.
3.4 Challenges
We fully recognize that this transformative paradigm in-
troduces significant changes to multiple aspects of the In-
ternet, ranging from routing to system scalability. Since
TARN builds on existing Internet infrastructure, to realize
TARN in practice, we must identify these challenges and
provide sound solutions.
3.4.1 IP address collision avoidance.
TARN works with both IPv4 and IPv6 networks. Address
collisions can occur, while the vast IPv6 address space
makes this mathematically impossible. Therefore, the ap-
proach is particularly flexible with IPv6. The probability of
having at least one collision when randomly mapping the
entire IPv4 space into IPv6 space is extremely small, ap-
proximately 3.906 × 10−28 compared with the probability
of being hit by a meteor being 5.49× 10−15.
As discussed later, with SDX, the impact of address col-
lisions can be minimized. Without SDX, collisions will
have to be resolved with known duplicate address detection
(DAD) methods and packet re-transmissions.
3.4.2 Efficient routing to/between dynamic addresses:
Traffic to these “ephemeral” addresses are routed to the de-
sired destination using BGP route injection, intermediate
software defined Internet exchanges (SDX), or a combina-
tion of the two. We inject BGP routes for these random
and dynamic addresses beforehand and withdraw them after
use. In today’s Internet, BGP route updates converge glob-
ally in just a few minutes. And the propagation of newly
announced prefixes happens almost instantaneously. We are
fully aware that ISPs today will not accept frequent BGP an-
nouncement, although such operation is technically feasible
and compatible with existing Internet infrastructure. The
purpose of this work is to demonstrate the technical feasi-
bility and usefulness of this novel approach to pave the way
for potential, future global change.
3.4.3 IP address synchronization
IP synchronization between the two ends of an established
session is necessary. We use a pseudo-random number gen-
erator with a chosen seed to generate a different set ofN ad-
dresses. To reduce the number of BGP route injections, we
limit the generated addresses to be within a smaller range of
randomly generated, or deliberately chosen ASes.
The random number generator and seed are and only a
properly authenticated client can access via a covert reverse
DNS channel [15]. The covert protocol allows us to trans-
forms strings into legitimate DNS records. The server en-
codes the message into a list of domain names and register
them to a randomly chosen IP address. The client does a
reverse-DNS lookup on the IP address and decodes the do-
main names to retrieve the message. Different from DNS
tunneling, this does not use uncommon record types (e.g.,
TXT records) or carry suspiciously large volume of traffic
as DNS payloads. On the contrary, the resulting traffic will
be normal DNS lookup/reverse-lookup traffic, which will
not attract attention. The data transmission is not vulnera-
ble to DPI.
4 Experimentation
A series of experiments were conducted to demonstrate
the viability and networking capability of this innovative ad-
dressing paradigm. The goal is to show that we can effec-
tively maintain the communication session, while the end
host adopts short-lived and randomized IP addresses.
4.1 Testbeds
Our experiment is set up using the networking resources
provided by GENI [13] and the PEERING testbed [3].
GENI is a NSF-founded large-scale distributed testbed that
gives academics and corporations access to various physi-
cal and virtual network resources. With GENI, we can test
communications between hosts in different geographic lo-
cations across the world. The PEERING testbed is a real
BGP testbed that connects to real networks to physical uni-
versity networks and IXPs around the world. Traditional
inter-domain routing experiments were either based on pas-
sive observation of existing routes or on simulations, which
greatly restricts the fidelity of the results. PEERING re-
moves these limitations by providing researchers a platform
to conduct inter-domain routing tests in realistic environ-
ments.
4.2 Experiment design
The experiment consists of two parts: BGP route prop-
agation and maintaining the communication session while
end host’s IP address changes. The configuration of the ex-
periment is shown in Figure 3, where the client and server
sit on GENI racks located at NPS and NYSERNet, respec-
tively. On each rack, we installed a virtual network emulator
called miniNExT [27], which extends mininet [2] to easily
build complex networks. Each miniNExT includes a Flood-
light manager [4] that rewrites packet headers, an OVS that
interacts with the Floodlight, and a Quagga router [6] that
runs a virtual BGP router to communicate with the external
BGP routers of other ASes.
4.2.1 BGP route propagation
The PEERING testbed maintains multiple IP prefixes for
experimental purposes. Researchers can announce BGP
prefixes at selected US and EU point of presences (PoPs)
to the Internet. As illustrated in Figure 3, the Quagga router
at each end is attached to the upstream PEERING server
via PEERING’s OpenVPN tunnel. PEERING runs its own
Quagga software routers to establish a BGP session with
their neighbors. Instead of running the BGP route selec-
tion process, those PEERING servers provide PEERING
clients with full control over BGP route announcements.
Our Quagga routers build a BGP peer session with PEER-
ING’s Quagga routers. Any BGP announcement from our
Quagga router can propagate across the Internet through the
PEERING servers, and vice versa. The PEERING server
will just relay the announcements as long as the BGP an-
nouncement is confirmed valid by PEERING.
Four IP prefixes were reserved for our experiment:
184.164.243.0/24 for server side and 184.164.242.0/24 for
client side. This provides two blocks of contiguous routable
IP addresses.
4.2.2 Maintaining communication sessions
In this experiment, only the server changes its address, and
the client needs to keep track the server’s IP address. This
conforms to the use case of censorship circumvention pre-
sented in section 3. We leveraged a Floodlight OpenFlow
controller that sits on each end to maintain the communica-
tion between client and server.
Each Floodlight controller keeps an ordered list of IP ad-
dresses called external IP addresses that the server is going
to use within a certain time frame. In our experiment, a
fixed internal IP is adopted, which the client/server process
talks to directly. This presents the illusion that the applica-
tion is talking to the same IP all the time while the external
IP changes. Floodlight manages the flow rules that rewrite
the packet header for port forwarding. The Floodlight con-
troller generates two types of packet: IP packets and ARP
packets. With each packet type, there are a pair of flows:
one flow rewrites the outgoing packets by changing the in-
ternal IP address to the current external IP address; while
the other flow rewrites the incoming packets and changes
the external IP address to internal IP address. In addition,
Floodlight controller is also responsible for updating the ex-
ternal IP address at a pre-defined rate that is only known to
the client.
4.3 Experimental Results
Since TARN is an ongoing project, only preliminary ex-
perimental results are provided. It is assumed that a pseu-
dorandom sequence of IP addresses are known to both the
server and client. It is also assumed that the server rapidly
changes its IP address in a predetermined order that is
known to both ends. We have provided methods of IP syn-
chronization between the client and server in section 3.4.
The corresponding module will be implemented and inte-
grated in future work. The configuration of the experiment
is consistent with the censorship circumvention use case in
Figure 1, where the server’s IP address changes at a fixed
rate.
The objective of this experiment is to demonstrate two
basic functions of TARN: (1) The SDN controller offers
the capability to manipulate the hopping pattern of IP ad-
dresses, and (2) TARN maintains a stable and fluent ses-
sion while the server frequently changes its IP address (111
different IP addresses from 184.164.243.0/24 with average
dwell time between hops< 10 sec).
miniNExT 
    OVS     Client    Quagga     Quagga     OVS    
Server 
    BGP routes     BGP routes 
miniNExT 
Figure 3: Configuration of the experiment.
We had the client send out 672 IP packets and collected
data received on the server. All the packets were success-
fully received by the client. Given that the packets were sent
at a stable rate, this means the dwell time for each IP address
the server used were randomized. Moreover, any given dis-
tribution of IP hopping can be achieved using an SDN con-
troller. Although only preliminary results are available, they
fully support that we can effectively maintain the commu-
nication session, while the end host adopts short-lived and
randomized IP addresses. This lays the foundation for fur-
ther experimentation, including hopping pattern manipula-
tion and two-end IP hopping.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
The TARN system is highly resistant DNS/IP filtering
and traffic analysis, by removing a major vulnerability in to-
day’s addressing scheme – the fixed binding between hosts
and IP addresses, which has been used by cyber attacks to
easily locate their victims. TARN relies on the promising
SDN technologies to realize stable and efficient routing be-
tween end hosts with dynamic addresses.
We lay out the technical foundation and roadmap for a
scalable implementation of this transformative paradigm.
Three different implementation strategies are provided,
each of which performs IP hopping where appropriate to
the users’ specific requirements given the trust boundary.
We show that TARN is compatible with today’s Internet in-
frastructure by properly addressing the possible challenges
in deploying TARN.
The one-way randomization version of the SDN-based
solution was implemented and tested on PEERING’s BGP
testbed. Since TARN is an ongoing project, only prelim-
inary experimental results are provided in this paper. The
obtained results demonstrate that: (1) SDN controllers al-
low users to easily manipulate the IP hopping pattern to
their own needs; and (2) it is completely feasible to main-
tain a stable and fluent communication between end hosts
of dynamic IPs. This has laid the foundation for further ex-
perimentation.
Future work includes (1) performing experiments to
demonstrate the utility of the other designs, (2) completing
the two-way IP randomization, (3) performing an in-depth
security analysis of the SDN-based TARN solution, and (4)
implementing TARN as the future of SDX.We will perform
extensive, invasive testing to rigorously prove that TARN is
to IP/DNS filtering, DPI and side-channel attacks. These
results, in conjunction with our preliminary security analy-
sis, show great strides towards a security-centered Internet
without compromising performance.
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